Usp 797 beyond use dating
July 20, 2005) (reasoning that “[b]ecause there is an adequate remedy available to plaintiff under the Privacy Act, he cannot resort to the APA for relief”); , 773 F.
The District Court for the District of Columbia has analyzed the relationship between the Privacy Act and the Health Care Quality Improvement Act (“HCQIA”), Pub. The court concluded that because the procedures promulgated by the Department pursuant to HCQUIA “provide less protection than the procedures required by the Privacy Act,” it held that the Department “must adhere to the requirements of the Privacy Act when considering a dispute to a record in the” database established by HCQIA. The District Court for the District of Columbia has also analyzed the relationship between the Privacy Act and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), 42 U. The court dismissed this claim on the ground that it “would be inconsistent with both HIPAA and the Privacy Act’s plain language” to “recognize under the Privacy Act a private right of action that Congress has expressly denied under HIPAA.” , 323 F.
20, 1987) (“Because the Privacy Act does have its own enforcement mechanism” for plaintiff’s claims relating to the disclosure of confidential information, “it preempts the FTCA.”); , 964 F.
2013) (explaining that “[b]ecause plaintiff’s Privacy Act claim is rooted in federal rather than state law, and because Oregon has no analogous law, plaintiff cannot allege a claim under the FTCA for negligent violation of the Privacy Act”); , 257 F.
1994) (“[T]he existence of remedies under the Privacy Act [for alleged inaccuracy] preclude plaintiff’s entitlement to mandamus, even though his claim under that act is substantively meritless.”), , 59 F.3d 170 (6th Cir. In the context of civil remedies, the only court of appeals to consider the issue has held that the Privacy Act “does not limit the remedial rights of persons to pursue whatever remedies they may have under the [Federal Tort Claims Act]” for privacy violations consisting of record disclosures.
§ 7852(e) “plainly states that the provisions of the Privacy Act do not apply, directly or indirectly, to assessing the possibility of a tax liability”); , No.
July 24, 2012) (finding court “lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim on the basis of 26 U.
§ 7852(e), which renders certain provisions of the Privacy Act inapplicable to the determination of the existence of tax-related liability”); , 842 F.
It has also been held that “[b]ecause the Privacy Act provides its own remedy for an agency’s improper refusal to process a proper request for information, [a plaintiff] is not entitled to mandamus relief.” , No.
1993) (recognizing applicability of subsection (e)(3) to IRS summons, and possibility “that a summons may be judicially enforceable yet not meet the disclosure requirements of the Privacy Act”).